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Abstract. We formulate a sort of “generic” Cosmological argument, i.e., a Cos-
mological argument that shares premises (e.g., “contingent, concretely existing 
entities have a cause”) with numerous versions of the argument. We then defend 
each of the premises by off ering pragmatic arguments for them. We show that 
an endorsement of each premise will lead to an increase in expected utility; so 
in the absence of strong evidence that the premises are false, it is rational to en-
dorse them. Th erefore, it is rational to endorse the Cosmological argument, and 
so rational to endorse theism. We then consider possible objections.
INTRODUCTION
Cosmological arguments claim that a special being of some sort (e.g., 
a fi rst cause, a necessary cause, an unmoved mover, etc.) must exist to 
explain or account for the existence of the universe; it is then claimed 
that this special being is God. Such arguments have a venerable history. 
Th e fi rst cosmological argument occurs in Plato’s Laws.1 Aristotle, along 
with various Islamic theologians, sharpened the argument before it was 
discussed again by Aquinas.2 Th e argument also received much attention 
during the early modern period; Leibniz and Clarke both defended it 
1 See Plato, Th e Laws of Plato, translated by T.L. Pangle (New York: Basic Books, 
1980), Book X. 
2 See Aristotle, Th e Complete Works of Aristotle, volumes I and II, edited by J. Barnes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 4th C BCE/1984), especially Physics VIII, 4-6 and 
Metaphysics XII, 1-6. See also Aquinas, Summa Th eologica, translated by the Fathers of 
the English Dominican Republic (New York, NY: Benzinger Bros, 13th C/1948), especial-
ly the fi rst part, question 2, article 3.
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while Hume and Kant famously criticized it.3 Th e argument has con-
temporary defenders too, including Craig, Gale and Pruss, and Koons.4 
We also defend the cosmological argument. In the following section, we 
discuss the version of the argument that we defend. As we show, there are 
four premises that need justifi cation. Th en, rather than focus on meta-
physical or scientifi c considerations in favor of the premises, we attempt 
a diff erent strategy. We off er a series of pragmatic arguments that show 
that it is at least rational to endorse the premises; if so, it is rational to 
endorse theism. Finally, we consider possible objections. 
THE ARGUMENT
Th e version of the argument that we defend consists of seven steps, and 
can be thought of as a sort of generic Cosmological argument. Th e fi rst 
premise is, 
 (1) If x is a contingent, concretely existing entity, x has a cause.
Th e second premise claims, 
 (2) Our universe is a contingent, concretely existing entity.
3 For the history of the argument, see W. L. Craig, Th e Cosmological Argument from 
Plato to Leibniz (London: Th e Macmillan Press, 1980). For Leibniz on the Cosmological 
argument, see Th e Monadology, translated by George MacDonald Ross, 1714/1999. See 
also S. Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God and Other Writings, ed-
ited by E. Vailati (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1705/1998). For Hume’s criti-
cism, see Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1779/1980), part 
IX. See also I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1980/1998), especially the Transcendental Dialectic, Book II, Chapter 3, section 5. 
4 See W. L. Craig, Th e Kalām Cosmological Argument (London: Th e Macmillan Press, 
1979) and “In Defense of the Kalām Cosmological Argument,” Faith and Philosophy 14.2 
(1997): 236–247. Also see R. Gale and A. R. Pruss, “A New Cosmological Argument,” Re-
ligious Studies 35 (1999): 461–476 and R. Koons, “A New Look at the Cosmological Ar-
gument,” American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 171-192. Of course, the argument 
has many contemporary opponents as well; see, e.g., G. Oppy, Arguing about Gods (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), chapter 3.
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By “universe,” we have something like the commonsense usage in 
mind, i.e., the universe is the sum total of all concretely existing matter 
and energy.5 Th e next step follows from the fi rst two with basic logic, 
 (3) Our universe has a cause.
Step (4) is a disjunction that has the form of excluded middle, 
 (4) Either the cause of our universe is itself a part of the universe or 
it is not a part of our universe, i.e., it is outside the universe.
Step (5) claims, 
 (5) Th e cause of our universe is not a part of our universe.
We interpret this claim in the mereological sense; the universe can be 
thought of as a whole, and the cause of the universe is not a part of that 
whole. Step (6) follows from (4) and (5) with disjunctive syllogism, 
 (6) Th e cause of our universe must be outside the universe.
Finally, 
 (7) Th is cause of our universe is “God.”
Th e steps that need justifi cation are (1), (2), (5) and (7). Steps (3) and 
(6) follow from other steps and (4) is a logical truth. We defend (1), (2), 
(5) and (7) in successive sections.
PREMISE ONE
We now off er a pragmatic argument for premise one. Th e argument at-
tempts to show that even assuming that one is not certain of the truth 
of the premise, it is still rational to endorse it. As we show, accepting 
the fi rst premise has more expected utility than rejecting it, so assuming 
5 We do not take “universe” to mean “everything that exists,” as some do. Below, we 
argue that there is at least one thing that exists that is not a part of the universe. 
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that it is rational to increase expected utility, it is rational to endorse the 
premise, at least in the absence of strong evidence that it is false. 
So, suppose that it is rational to increase expected utility. Also sup-
pose that it is generally better to have knowledge than not have it; that is, 
knowledge is desirable and an increase in knowledge is also an increase 
in utility, at least most of time.6 Given these modest assumptions, it is ra-
tional to endorse any claim that leads to an increase in knowledge and so 
in expected utility, at least if we do not have suffi  cient evidence to reject 
the claim. Given that (1) has lead to a vast increase in knowledge and 
utility insofar as it is a vital methodological assumption of science, for 
example, it is rational to endorse (1).7 To rephrase the argument: (1) is 
either true or false. And we have two options: (a) we can believe that (1) 
is true or (b) we can reject it. Suppose that we opt for (a). Th e expected 
utility for this option is quite high: the assumption that (1) is true has 
led to the discovery of countless scientifi c truths as well as a number of 
more banal though still useful truths (e.g., “eating causes my hunger to 
go away”), and this is a very positive outcome. Indeed, (1) is a princi-
ple that makes reality itself intelligible.8 Further, the utility will be high 
whether (1) is in fact true or not (if we endorse (1) but it is false, we seem 
to lose very little, at least when weighed against the gains of endorsing 
(1)). Now, suppose that we opt for (b): the assumption that (1) is false 
would not lead to a positive outcome; indeed, it would lead to disastrous 
consequences. If we reject (1), reality would become unintelligible. If we 
did not think in terms of cause and eff ect, then we might simply stop 
eating, we wouldn’t bother looking for cures for diseases, and so on. In 
short, the expected utility for rejecting (1) is extremely low; we might 
become extinct. If it is rational to increase expected utility, then it is 
rational to endorse (1).9 
6 We say “most of the time” because there might be cases in which it is better, at least 
from an expected utility standpoint, to lack knowledge than have it. Quite simply, some 
truths might make us unhappy, so knowing them might decrease our happiness. Even so, 
in general, it is better to have knowledge than not have it; who will deny this? 
7 Science seeks to discover the causal relationships between entities; this is the goal 
of science. But if (1) is false, this goal is undermined; the search for causal relationships 
presupposes that there are causal relationships to be found.
8 See R. Taylor, Metaphysics (Englewood Cliff s: Prentice-Hall, 1992). 
9 To be clear, the claims that this argument rests on are extremely weak and plausible: 
(i) the expected utility for reality being intelligible is greater than the expected utility for 
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PREMISE TWO
Premise (2) claims that “Our universe is a contingent, concretely existing 
entity.” Our universe does not exist necessarily; it might not have existed. 
Th is claim is prima facie plausible; many involved, including some op-
ponents of theism, will grant that it is true. Nevertheless, the claim re-
quires some justifi cation. First, note that if (2) is false, then our universe 
exists necessarily, and so everything in our universe necessarily exists 
exactly as it does etc. Consider the following argument: our universe is 
composed of a number of entities that stand in various relationships to 
one another; call our universe “u.”  Now consider a universe that is dif-
ferent from u in some random respect, no matter how minor (e.g., in this 
universe, Jupiter has an additional moon, but the diff erence can be any-
thing); call this universe “u*.” By hypothesis, universe u is not numeri-
cally identical to u*; this obviously follows by Leibniz’s law, for instance. 
Furthermore, u* is either possible or is not possible. If u* is not possible, 
then everything in our universe is necessary; if nothing, no matter how 
insignifi cant, could have been diff erent, then the way things are in our 
universe is the way they must be. But if (2) is false, then u* is not possible 
(because our universe is necessary, and it is not identical to u*). But then 
if (2) is false, everything about our universe is necessary. Th e denial of 
(2) leads to an implausible superessentialism that few would fi nd accept-
able (an exception would be Spinoza).10 
So, if (2) is false, everything about our universe is necessary, and any-
thing that happens necessarily happens, therefore the future is “closed,” 
i.e., it is already set in stone. Th is would be undesirable for a number 
of reasons. A gloomy fatalism threatens. It’s diffi  cult to see why anyone 
should be praised for an accomplishment that was fated to occur. It’s 
diffi  cult to see how there could be moral responsibility in such a world, 
in which every act was already predetermined. It’s also diffi  cult to see 
reality being unintelligible and (ii) it is rational to increase expected utility. Th ese are the 
only claims this argument needs. 
10 See B. Spinoza, Th e Collected Works of Spinoza Vol. I, edited and translated by Ed-
win Curley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1677/1985), Book I. Th e denial of (2) 
is so implausible many will be content to accept (2) already, even without a pragmatic 
argument for it. 
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how there could be free will.11 Intuitively, if nothing could have possibly 
been diff erent than the way it is, then any “choice” that you make could 
not have turned out diff erently, so it appears that the “choice” was not 
really a choice at all, and so was not really free. If there is only one pos-
sible way that the universe might be, then the outcomes of all “decisions” 
are predestined, and so these “decisions” are not really decisions aft er 
all etc. Now, either (2) is true or false, and we can either endorse (2) or 
reject it. Suppose that we reject (2) and (2) happens to be true. In this 
scenario, we eff ectively deny that the future is open, even though it is. 
Th is is clearly a negative outcome, at least given the plausible assumption 
that we would be happier if we believe that the future is open and thereby 
avoid a gloomy fatalism. Suppose that we reject (2) and (2) happens to 
be false.  In this scenario, we are correct in asserting that the future is 
fi xed. Yet this still appears to be a negative outcome because even if the 
future is fi xed, we would be happier believing that it is not.  In short, 
both outcomes for a rejection of (2) have negative expected utility. Now 
suppose that we assert (2) and (2) is true. Th is is a positive outcome: the 
future is not fi xed and we assert it. But even if we assert (2) and (2) is 
false, this is still a positive outcome because again, it is “better” (at least 
in terms of expected utility) to falsely believe that the future is open even 
if it is not. Given that both outcomes for the endorsement of (2) are posi-
tive and that both outcomes for the rejection of (2) are negative, there is 
more expected utility for the endorsement of (2), and if it is rational to 
increase expected utility, then it is rational to endorse (2).            
PREMISE FIVE
Premise (5) claims that “the cause of our universe is not a part of the 
universe,” in the sense that the universe can be thought of as a whole that 
does not contain its cause as a part. 
11 For more on the importance of free will, see, e.g., T. O’Conner, “Free Will,” Th e 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), edited by E. N. Zalta, URL = 
http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/fall2008 /entries/freewill/, introduction: “Free will 
also appears to be a condition on desert for one’s accomplishments (why sustained eff ort 
and creative work are praiseworthy); on the autonomy and dignity of persons; and on the 
value we accord to love and friendship…” See also R. Kane, Th e Signifi cance of Free Will 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) and R. Clarke, Libertarian Accounts of Free 
Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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Prima facie, it might appear diffi  cult to formulate a pragmatic argu-
ment for (5) – the claim that the cause of the universe is outside the 
universe – similar to the ones given for (1) and (2). Th e endorsement of 
(5), at least taken in isolation, does not seem to have positive expected 
utility; but it does not appear to have negative expected utility either. At 
fi rst glance, the denial of (5) doesn’t appear to have a negative (or posi-
tive) expected utility either. However, given (1) and (2), (5) is true. First, 
suppose that (1) and (2) are true and therefore the universe has a cause. 
Also suppose that (5) is false; so, the cause of the universe is a part of the 
universe. But this cannot be the case, for if the cause of the universe is 
a part of the universe, we still lack a cause for the universe. Th at is, (1) 
and (2) entail that the universe has a cause, but this cause cannot be 
a part of the universe because anything that is a part of the universe de-
mands a cause itself along with all of the other entities that compose the 
universe. But then (5) follows. Also note that even if there is an infi nite 
chain of contingent causes, this is not suffi  cient to defeat (5), for the in-
fi nite chain, as a whole, still needs a cause. (1) and (2) jointly entail that 
the universe must have a cause; an infi nite causal chain of contingent 
causes (assuming that there is one) would just be the universe; therefore, 
the infi nite causal chain as a whole must have cause. Of course, this is-
sue is related to Hume’s famous objection that if we can explain the parts 
of a whole, we can explain the whole, so we need not venture outside of 
the universe to fi nd an explanation for it.12 But as Rowe claims, “When 
the existence of each member of a collection is explained by reference to 
some other member of that very same collection then it does not follow 
that the collection itself has an explanation.”13 
Second, suppose again that (1) and (2) are true, so the universe has 
a cause. Posit the set S that consists of all of the entities in the universe. If 
an entity e is the cause of S, then e is the ultimate cause of everything in 
S. But if e is a part of S, and if e causes everything in S, then e causes itself, 
which is incoherent.14 Some theists (e.g., Descartes) have said that God is 
self-caused, so there is at least one example of an entity that causes itself, 
12 See again, D. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1779/1980), part IX.
13 W. Rowe, Th e Cosmological Argument (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1975), 264.
14 We are assuming that there is no backwards causation. 
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but obviously the atheist cannot claim that e is God.15 So, if one rejects 
(5), one must reject either (1) or (2), and as we just saw, this would have 
a negative expected utility. Given that a denial of (5) has negative ex-
pected utility, and given that the endorsement of (5) does not, then if it is 
rational to maximize expected utility, it is rational to endorse (5).16
STEP SEVEN
A serious problem for the cosmological argument is the presence of 
a “gap” between the sort of being that the argument establishes (e.g., 
a fi rst cause, a necessary cause) and the classical theistic conception of 
God (i.e., a being that is a necessary fi rst cause, but is also omnipotent, 
omniscient, omnibenevolent and so on). An opponent can claim, for ex-
ample, that even assuming that a given cosmological argument is sound, 
all it establishes is that, e.g., a fi rst cause exists, but perhaps this fi rst cause 
is a being that is indiff erent to us, or is evil or incompetent, or is simply 
the material that exploded in the big bang and so is not even sentient?17 
Th is problem applies to the version of the argument we defend as well. In 
this section, we discuss this issue; i.e., we attempt to justify the inference 
from (6) to (7).
Th e fi nal step can also be given a pragmatic justifi cation. We discuss 
two questions, the fi rst of which is the following: is the cause of the uni-
verse a personal or impersonal being? In other words, is this cause (a) 
a sentient being that, e.g., at least takes an interest in us (and so might 
care about how we behave and might have some sort of a plan for us and 
so on), or (b) is this being sentient and completely indiff erent to us or is 
15 See R. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy in Th e Philosophical Writigs of 
Descartes, Volume 2, translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff , and D. Murdoch (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1641/1984).
16 Even if one could somehow show that the expected utility for a denial of (5), and so 
a denial of either (1) or (2), is positive, one would still need to show that it is greater than 
the expected utility of accepting either (1) or (2). 
17 For more on the “gap problem,” see A. Pruss, “Leibnizian Cosmological Argu-
ments,” Th e Blackwell Companion to Natural Th eology, edited by W. L. Craig and J.P. 
Moreland (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1999). Pointing to such gaps in theistic argu-
ments to refute them is of course an old strategy; see, e.g., Hume’s Dialogues again. 
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it simply a non-sentient hunk of matter etc?18 So, suppose that we assert 
that (a) is true, i.e., the cause is a sentient being that takes an interest in 
us of some sort. And suppose that we are correct. In this scenario, we 
gain, or at least have the potential to gain, quite a bit. For example, if the 
cause of the universe cares about what we do, or has a plan of some sort 
for us, then our beliefs or actions might have some higher meaning, and 
plausibly it is better to know all of this and act accordingly than not (and 
this is to say nothing of the possible eschatological implications of believ-
ing in and following the will of a perfectly good God; i.e., our ultimate 
destiny – oft en but not necessarily conceived of as an eternal residence 
in heaven or hell – might be aff ected by our belief in God and our acting 
in accordance with God’s will). Indeed, given the plausible assumption 
that we would be happier if we think our life has a higher meaning than 
not, an endorsement of (a) has positive expected utility. If we endorse 
(a) but (b) is actually true, then we will be living a lie, but plausibly, we 
will still be better off , from an expected utility standpoint, thinking that 
our beliefs and actions have a higher meaning even though they do not. 
Whether (a) is true or not, we gain positive expected utility from believ-
ing that it is. Now suppose that we assert (b): the cause of the universe 
does not take an interest in us, either because it simply doesn’t care about 
us or because it is not even sentient. If we assert (b) and (b) is false, then 
this seems to have a very negative utility. For example, if our lives have 
some higher meaning, yet we are not aware of this and do not act accord-
ingly, it seems we lose a great deal (again, if a traditional eschatological 
policy is embraced, we could lose everything). But if we assert (b) and 
(b) happens to be true, then we still lose out, because again, it is better 
to believe that one’s life has a higher meaning than not, even if the belief 
is false. But the main point is that one risks so much – too much – in 
assuming that the fi rst cause is impersonal because the fi rst cause might 
be personal. A belief in option (a) has a higher expected utility than 
a belief in option (b), so assuming that it is rational to maximize expected 
utility, we should endorse (a). Th at is, in the absence of strong evidence 
that says otherwise, we should believe that the cause of the universe is 
18 Th e disjuncts in (b) amount to the same thing from a practical standpoint, in our 
opinion, so we treat them together. If the cause of the universe is sentient yet wholly in-
diff erent to us, then so far as we are concerned, the cause might as well be a non-sentient 
entity. 
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a personal being that at least takes an interest in us because it is in our 
best interest to do so.19
At this point, it is clear that at least some of our pragmatic arguments 
have a strong affi  nity with another pragmatic argument in philosophy of 
religion, Pascal’s Wager.20 Of course, Pascal argues that we should believe 
in God, even in the absence of a proof of God’s existence, because doing 
so is in our best interest. We have little or nothing to gain by not believ-
ing in God, but potentially might lose everything. On the other hand, by 
believing, we might gain everything. Th e argument above is very similar. 
We have little or nothing to gain by denying that the cause of the uni-
verse is a personal being. On the other hand, by believing, we might gain 
everything. 
Th e second question we address is: given that the cause of the universe 
is sentient and takes an interest in us, is this being all good or all evil?21 
Again, we have two options: (a) we can assert that the being is good, and 
so is just, rational, non-deceitful, full of love, or has whatever properties 
one might consider to be good, or (b) we can assert that it is evil, and so is 
unjust, irrational or at least non-rational, deceitful, hateful or has what-
ever properties one might consider to be evil. Suppose we opt incorrectly 
for (b), i.e., we assert that the being is evil but it is in fact good. Th is is 
clearly a negative outcome. For suppose, as certainly seems to be the case, 
that we would be happier believing that the being that caused the uni-
verse – and so us – is good than believing that it is evil. If so, then we lose 
happiness while believing a falsehood. Furthermore, if we incorrectly opt 
for (b), then it will be impossible to correctly determine the being’s inten-
tions for us. Again, this being takes an interest in us, so it might want us 
to live a certain way, or might have a higher purpose in mind for us etc. 
But if we assume that the being is evil, then we could never accurately 
19 Again, this argument relies on two very weak claims: (i) it is better (in terms of ex-
pected utility) to think that one’s life has a higher meaning or higher purpose than not 
and (ii) it is rational to increase expected utility. 
20 B. Pascal, Pascal’s Pensées, translated by W. F. Trotter, 1910.
21 Th is issue arises in a diff erent context in W. Morriston, “Th e Evidential Argument 
from Goodness,” Th e Southern Journal of Philosophy XLII (2004): 87-101, not to mention 
in Descartes’s Meditations. One might think we have posited a false dichotomy; perhaps 
God is more good than evil on average or is more evil than good on average? Even if one 
adds these possibilities though, our argument still works (because our argument can still 
show that it is rational to believe that God is good on average etc). 
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discern what it is this being wants us to do if it happens to be good. Now 
suppose that we assert (b), i.e., we assert that the being is evil, and the 
being is in fact evil. Th is option also has negative utility, for a number of 
reasons. First, the thought that there is an evil being that created the uni-
verse and so us is ominous, to say the least; we would be much happier 
believing that the being is good, even if it isn’t. Second, again, this being 
might have some higher plan for us, it might want us to live a certain 
way, and so on, but the will of an evil being could never be discerned, or 
at least could never be discerned with any degree of certainty, because 
of the likely character traits (i.e., irrationality, deceitfulness, etc.) that an 
evil being would have. So, we could never determine with any confi dence 
what this being expects from us. Th ird, even if we could correctly ascer-
tain this being’s intentions for us, we hopefully would not wish to fulfi ll 
them anyhow; since the being is evil, its intentions for us would likely 
be evil as well. In short, if we assert that the being is evil, then nothing 
is gained and much will be lost; whether the being is evil or not, there is 
negative expected utility to claiming that it is evil.22 
But if we assert (a), and so claim that the being is good, both out-
comes are positive. For if we assert that the being is good and it is good, 
then we might be able to discern its intentions for us, and we might wish 
to fulfi ll them, and the thought that a good being caused the universe is 
much more pleasant than the thought that the being is evil, and so on. 
Likewise, if we assert that the being is good yet it is evil, this is still better 
than thinking that the cause of the universe is evil for various reasons 
given above. So, given that both outcomes for holding that the cause of 
22 Someone might object that if we assume that the being is evil and it is evil, this 
gives us certain advantages. For example, perhaps we could somehow get on this being’s 
“good side” by performing immoral acts, like kicking puppies etc. But this is problematic 
for the reasons given above. If God is evil, God might be irrational, or at least deceitful, 
unjust etc. If so, there is no reliable way to determine what this God wants from crea-
tion. Th us, it is not as if a believer in this deceitful being can gain favor by, for example, 
performing evil acts. One might get on an evil being’s good side this way, but one just as 
easily might not (for all we know, this evil being might prefer those who go against the 
wishes of their creator, and so do good etc.). Again, since the being is not even truthful, 
there is simply no way to fi gure out what it wants. It could, for example, reward every-
one, or it might randomly torture some and reward others, or it might simply torture 
everyone. Nothing is gained, but much is potentially lost, by claiming that the cause of 
the universe is evil. 
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the universe is evil are negative, while both outcomes for holding that 
the cause is good are positive, and given that it is rational to increase 
expected utility, it is rational to assert that the cause is good.
Here is another way to look at our argument. Th ere are four possible 
scenarios: (i) we assert that God is evil and God is evil, (ii) we assert that 
God is evil but God is good, (iii) we assert that God is good but God is 
evil, and (iv) we correctly assert that God is good. Th e expected utility 
for (i) is zero at best because there is no reason to assume that an evil be-
ing would prefer that people believe in it; again, this being might torture 
everyone indiscriminately etc. Option (ii) has very low – if any – ex-
pected utility because a good God would probably not appreciate being 
considered evil. It is important to note that a decision to assert that God 
is evil might yield actual utility; for example, perhaps this being is evil 
and rewards those who believe in it. However, there is no expected utility 
to such a decision because there is no reason to expect that an evil God 
would be “pleased with” someone believing in it, and there is certainly 
no reason to assume that a good God would be “pleased with” someone 
who believed God to be evil (we are assuming that God being “pleased 
with” us would increase positive utility). Th is is hardly a profound claim: 
decisions do have unexpected consequences. Even so, it would be absurd 
to assume that all decisions will have unexpected consequences and de-
cide accordingly. If we were to do this, our decision-making faculties 
would be worthless. We would not, for example, wager a penny for a mil-
lion dollars, even if the odds of winning the bet were 99.9%, because of 
concerns related to possible unexpected consequences. Option (iii), for 
reasons expressed above (i.e., an evil God’s will is inherently undecipher-
able), has low expected utility as well; but option (iv) has high expected 
utility, so high that it makes the expected utility for claiming that God is 
good greater than the expected utility for claiming that God is evil. So, if 
we are rational, we should assert that God is good. 
OBJECTIONS
In this section, we consider some possible objections.
One might object, “Th e pragmatic arguments can only show that it 
is in our best interest to endorse your premises, and so theism. But this 
139COSMOLO GICAL ARGUMENT: A PRAGMATIC DEFENSE
does not mean the premises are true.” But this objection misconstrues 
the goal of the pragmatic arguments (and indeed, the goal of pragmatic 
arguments for theism in general). Th e pragmatic arguments do not at-
tempt to show that the premises are true; rather, they merely attempt to 
show that it is rational to endorse them. Th e claim that theism is rational 
is still a signifi cant claim; many atheists claim that theism is irrational.23 
One might also object that it is rational to endorse the premises of the 
Cosmological argument only in the absence of strong refutations of the 
premises. If there are such refutations, then this overrides the pragmatic 
benefi ts we get from believing that the premises are true, so we should 
conclude they are false. It might be rational to endorse a claim if it in-
creases expected utility, but if it can be shown that the claim is certainly 
false, or even most likely false, it would then be irrational to endorse it. 
But the problem with this objection is that none of the arguments against 
the premises of the Cosmological argument are conclusive. 
For example, it has been claimed that the argument is contradictory. 
Th e fi rst premise claims that everything must have a cause. If so, there 
must be a cause for the fi rst cause, but a fi rst cause cannot have a cause, 
by defi nition. Pruss refers to this issue as the “Taxicab Problem,” aft er 
Schopenhauer’s remark that in the Cosmological argument, the Princi-
ple of Suffi  cient Reason is similar to a taxicab that is used to get some-
where, then sent away when no longer needed.24 Note, however, that the 
fi rst premise claims that every contingent entity must have a cause. If one 
holds that the fi rst cause is necessary, as theists will, there is no contra-
diction. In other words, since – by design – (1) only applies to contingent 
beings, one cannot apply it to the existence of a necessary being to ask 
what its cause is. Th is is a commonplace response to the Taxicab prob-
lem (it is mentioned in Pruss, for example); we bring the issue up only 
because the objection is so common. 
For a diff erent example, some (e.g., Hume) have claimed that premise 
one is conceivably, and so possibly, false.25 We can easily conceive of 
23 On the alleged irrationality of theism, see, e.g., R. Dawkins, Th e God Delusion 
(Transworld Publishers, 2006).
24 See again A. Pruss, “Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments,” Th e Blackwell Com-
panion to Natural Th eology, edited by W. L. Craig and J.P. Moreland (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing, 1999).
25 Again, Hume’s most direct attack on the Cosmological argument is in the 
Dialogues, part IX. 
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a contingent entity simply appearing ex nihilo, so the fi rst premise is not 
necessarily true. Th e objection is far from conclusive, however; in fact, 
it seems deeply misguided. Th e fi rst premise might be true in our world 
yet false in some logically possible worlds; for instance, perhaps the laws 
of nature entail (1) in our world, but the laws of nature that hold in our 
world, or any laws of nature at all, might not hold in some logically pos-
sible world, so (1) is false in that world. But (1) need not be necessar-
ily true; it merely needs to be true in our world. Perhaps the argument 
merely shows that it is rational to think that our universe, at least, must 
have a fi rst cause?26 Th is would still be a theologically interesting result. 
To rephrase all of this: we can imagine that a claim might be false, yet the 
claim might still be true in the actual world. We can imagine that George 
W. Bush was never president, for example; but unfortunately, this doesn’t 
make it so. Even assuming that conceivability entails possibility (and this 
is of course controversial), conceivability does not entail actuality, but it 
would have to for the objection to succeed.27 
For yet another example, one could object that premise (2) might be 
false. Our universe is certainly a concretely existing entity, but perhaps 
our universe is not contingent? Perhaps something had to exist, for in-
stance? But this too is inconclusive. First, it is not clear that something 
had to exist. Th is point has been debated for centuries.28 But more im-
portantly, even if some entity had to exist, this does not mean that our 
universe had to exist. For example, suppose that someone says that no 
universe can be empty, so a given universe might contain a single grain 
of sand, for example. Even assuming that this is correct, this universe is 
not numerically identical to our universe (by Leibniz’s law) (see above). 
Th e claim that there has to be something in any given universe does not 
entail that any given universe is our universe, and so does not entail that 
our universe had to exist, and so does not entail that (2) is false.
26 Of course, this fi rst cause will necessarily exist for the theist, but this is consistent 
with saying that the argument only establishes a fi rst cause in our world. 
27 Spinoza (Book I of Th e Ethics) claimed that conceivability entails actuality because 
he collapsed the possible into the actual. Other examples are diffi  cult to fi nd.
28 See B. Reichenbach, “Cosmological Argument,” Th e Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), edited by E. N. Zalta. URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/ fall2008/entries/cosmological-argument/, 2008.
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CONCLUSION
We argued that it is rational to accept the premises of the Cosmologi-
cal argument because endorsing these premises leads to an increase in 
expected utility; therefore, it is rational to endorse theism. If one thinks 
that (i) it is rational to increase expected utility, and also (ii) that know-
ledge is a positive thing, (iii) that we would be happier if the future is 
open than if it is not, (iv) that if there is a chance that our lives might 
have some higher purpose, then it is better to know this than not, and 
(v) that we would be better off  assuming that the creator of the universe 
is good than assuming it is evil, one should conclude that it is rational to 
endorse theism.29 
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